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To VEST OR NOT TO VEST? THAT IS THE QUESTION.
THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES AND
PREFERENTIAL RIGHTS TO PURCHASE IN
MISSISSIPPI OIL AND GAS LAW
Jessica L. Thornhill*
I. INTRODUCTION
Much like any issue concerning the Rule Against Perpetuities, the rule
is convoluted at best when discussing its application to oil and gas transac-
tions. Up until 1999, Mississippi's stance on the Rule Against Perpetuities
in commercial transactions was unclear; however, the Mississippi Supreme
Court's decision in Murphy Exploration & Production Co. v. Sun Operat-
ing Ltd. Partnership' carved out an exception for preferential rights to
purchase within oil and gas leases, a "commercial transactions" exception.
However, whether this exception clarifies Mississippi's stance on the Rule
Against Perpetuities remains debatable.
Although the Rule Against Perpetuities may arise in many areas
within Mississippi's oil and gas law, this Comment focuses solely on the
rule's application to "preferential rights to purchase" or "rights of first re-
fusal" within oil and gas transactions and agreements. Following a modern
approach and in an effort to avoid the harsh consequences of the Rule
Against Perpetuities, courts hold, ninety percent of the time, "that the Rule
is not violated," especially when dealing with purely commercial oil and gas
transactions. 2
Part II of this Comment provides the background and prior case law
concerning Mississippi's Rule Against Perpetuities and preferential rights
to purchase in commercial transactions. Part III analyzes Mississippi's prior
position as well as Mississippi's current position on applying the Rule
Against Perpetuities to preferential rights provisions in oil and gas transac-
tions and discusses the progression from applying a strict mechanical rule
to focusing primarily on public policy.
* The author acknowledges the entire faculty and administration of Mississippi College School
of Law, with a special thank you to Adjunct Professor Jeff Trotter for inspiring such an intriguing topic.
The author would also like to thank the members and editorial board of the 2010-2011 and 2011-2012
Mississippi College Law Review for their hard work and dedication without which the end result would
not have been possible. Lastly, the author is forever indebted to her husband, Matthew, and her
parents, grandparents, and extended family for their unwavering support and encouragement
throughout her law school career as well as her other endeavors.
1. 747 So. 2d 260 (Miss. 1999).
2. J. Hovey Kemp & J. Forbes Newman, Hidden Rule Against Perpetuities Problems in Oil and
Gas Transactions, 32 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INsT. § 16.02 (1986).
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II. BACKGROUND
A. An Overview of Mississippi's Rule Against Perpetuities
In Pace v. Culpepper, the Mississippi Supreme Court stated the Rule
Against Perpetuities as follows:
The rule against perpetuities prohibits the creation of future
interests or estates which by possibility may not become
vested within a life or lives in being at the time of the testa-
tor's death or the effective date of the instrument creating
the future interest, and twenty-one years thereafter.
However, the rule can be traced back hundreds of years. Originating in
1682 in the well-known English decision, Duke of Norfolk's Case,4 the Rule
Against Perpetuities was designed to prevent tying up ownership of land
for long periods of time, thus preventing wealth from being concentrated in
the hands of a few.5 Generally stated, the Rule Against Perpetuities states
that "no interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than 21 years
after some life in being at the creation of the interest." 6 In other words, a
future interest in property is invalid unless the interest is absolutely certain
to vest before the end of a life in existence at the time the interest is cre-
ated plus twenty-one years. The rule applies not only to surface interests,
but also to mineral interests and oil and gas leaseholds.
Also concerned with unreasonable restraints on alienation, the pur-
pose of the Rule Against Perpetuities is to prevent restrictions on aliena-
tion that remove property from the stream of commerce for no
ascertainable period or duration.8 The rule was adopted primarily in re-
sponse to "donative transactions," such as wills or deeds, where wealthy
landowners would pass their estates to their heirs or family members, thus
tying up the property for an indefinite period of time. 9 These wealthy land-
owners, in order to ensure that their wealth and property stayed within
their families, would control the devolution of their property by expressly
conditioning the property's disposition in the future.10 Thus, "[t]he Rule
Against Perpetuities was [created] to limit these [types of] donative trans-
fers and prevent [wealthy landowners from alienating property] by tying
up . . . title . . . for generations or in perpetuity."11 This is reiterated in the
Fifth Circuit's opinion in Weber v. Texas Co.:
3. Pace v. Culpepper, 347 So. 2d 1313, 1316 (Miss. 1977) (citing Magee v. Magee's Estate, 111
So. 2d 394, 402 (Miss. 1959)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
4. (1682) 22 Eng. Rep. 931 (Ct. Ch.); 3 Ch. Cas. 1.
5. OLIN L. BROWDER ET AL., BASIC PROPERTY LAW 246-47 (5th ed. 1989).
6. Id. at 246.
7. Gary B. Conine, Property Provisions of the Operating Agreement-Interpretation, Validity,
and Enforceability, 19 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1263, 1376 (1988).
8. See Producers Oil Co. v. Gore, 610 P.2d 772 (Okla. 1980).
9. Brief of Appellants at 5, Murphy Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Sun Operating Ltd. P'ship, 747
So. 2d 260 (Miss. 1999) (No. 98-CA-00429).
10. Id. at 5-6.
11. Id. at 6.
524 [VOL. 30:523
TO VEST OR NOT TO VEST?
The rule against perpetuities springs from consideration [s]
of public policy. The underlying reason for and purpose of
the rule is to avoid fettering real property with future inter-
ests dependent upon contingencies unduly remote which
isolate the property and exclude it from commerce and de-
velopment for long periods of time, thus working an indirect
restraint upon alienation, which is regarded at common law
as a public evil.' 2
Essentially, the rule was designed to give present owners full use as well as
free alienability of their property.' 3
Specifically, the rule only applies to contingent interests, i.e., interests
that do not automatically vest at the time they are created. "[The Rule
Against Perpetuities] is a rule of property law which is designed to pre-
clude the creation of a contingent future interest, the vesting of which is
postponed for a period of time which is too long."' 4 Unlike a vested inter-
est, which vests at the time of creation and therefore never violates the
Rule Against Perpetuities, a contingent interest is uncertain as to when it
will vest.
This traditional common law approach is currently in effect in only a
few states, with the majority of states either abolishing the traditional rule
or modifying the rule by adopting alternatives such as the "wait-and-see"
doctrine.16
B. "Wait-and-See" Doctrine
As an alternative to the traditional Rule Against Perpetuities, Missis-
sippi has adopted the "wait-and-see" doctrine." Viewed as a "common
sense approach to perpetuities," the doctrine was first applied in Penn-
sylvania in 1947 and later expressed in the Second Restatement of Property
in 1979.'" Mississippi formally adopted the doctrine in 1966 in Phelps v.
Shrosphire.19 The Mississippi Supreme Court held that under this wait-
and-see approach, all contingent future interests are deemed valid so long
as they actually vest during the perpetuity period.2 0 Accordingly, "the va-
lidity of an interest is not judged by what might happen, but rather by what
12. 83 F.2d 807, 808 (5th Cir. 1936) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 561 (1936).
13. 2 WILLIAMS & MEYERS OIL AND GAS LAW § 325, at 66 (1997).
14. 2 KUNTz LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 17.1, at 517 (1987).
15. See id.
16. GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT, GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT & AMY MORRIS HEss, BOGERT'S
TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, § 214, at 216-17 (3d ed. 2011).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 218-19; Nantt v. Puckett Energy Co., 382 N.W.2d 655, 661 (N.D. 1986) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).
19. 183 So. 2d 158, 163 (Miss. 1966).
20. Id.
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does happen, by whether the interest in fact vests or fails [to vest] within
the perpetuities period." 2 '
Essentially, under the wait-and-see doctrine, courts are permitted to
determine the validity of a contingent interest at the time the interest vests
rather than when the interest is created.2 2 This gives courts much flexibility
in validating continent interests that actually do vest during the required
perpetuities period.2 3 In other words, courts "wait and see" what actually
happens to a contingent interest and whether the interest vests within the
required time frame rather than automatically voiding the interest at the
outset. 24
C. Ascertaining "Measuring Lives"
To determine whether a contingent interest has vested timely accord-
ing to the Rule Against Perpetuities, the first step is to determine the per-
petuities period. This step involves ascertaining the "measuring lives," i.e.,
those affecting whether the interest vests, to calculate the applicable perpe-
tuities period. 25
Under the common law Rule Against Perpetuities, you look to all per-
sons who can affect vesting and determine whether one allows you to prove
timely vesting, i.e., a validating life.2 6 If a validating life is not found, the
wait-and-see doctrine allows us to wait out the lives and see what actually
happens.2 7 However, under the wait-and-see doctrine, during what lives do
we wait and see?
Several jurisdictions, including Mississippi, provide that the "measur-
ing lives" under the wait-and-see approach are those that are causally re-
lated to vesting, also called the causal relationship principle. 2 8  This
principle includes all persons who can affect vesting and, therefore, easily
and accurately ascertains the wait-and-see measuring lives.29 Under the
wait-and-see doctrine, "absolute certainty . . . is not required, and hence
the measuring lives are those in being at the beginning of the period whose
continuance might affect vesting. These are lives which 'play a part in the
ultimate disposition of the property'; these are lives with a causal relation-
ship to vesting." 30
21. Estate of Anderson v. Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank, 541 So. 2d 423, 432 (Miss. 1989) (citing C &
D Inv. Co. v. Gulf Transp. Co., 526 So. 2d 526, 530 (Miss. 1988)).
22. See BOGERT, supra note 16, at 217-18.
23. See generally Phelps, 183 So. 2d 158.
24. BOGERT, supra note 16, at 218.
25. Estate of Anderson, 541 So. 2d at 430.
26. Jesse Dukeminier, Perpetuities: The Measuring Lives, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1648, 1648 (1985).
27. Id.
28. Id.; Estate of Anderson, 541 So. 2d at 431.
29. See Dukeminier, supra note 26, at 1648.
30. Jesse Dukeminier, Kentucky Perpetuities Law Restated and Reformed, 49 Kv. L.J. 3, 63
(1960).
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Accordingly, "[t]he life or lives in being which are selected for testing
whether the gift initially complies with the perpetuity rule are. . . the mea-
suring lives under the 'wait-and-see' rule."31 However, under the wait-and-
see doctrine, it is not fatal if a validating life is not found "among the lives
causally related to vesting;" proper procedure under the doctrine dictates
that you just wait out all the lives and see if the interest vests before their
deaths or within twenty-one years thereafter.3 2
However, common law prevents three types of causally related lives
from being used as measuring lives.3 3 First, redundant lives may not be
used as measuring lives, i.e., persons who cannot affect vesting after the
death of another measuring life. 34 Second, even though ascertainable, if
the number of measuring lives is unreasonable, they cannot be used.35
Lastly, if the persons are not reasonably ascertainable within the perpetu-
ities period, they cannot be used as measuring lives.36 These persons are
excluded as measuring lives because if included, it would be impossible to
say when the perpetuities period ends. 3 7
Moreover, "[t]he lives used as a measure of the period need not be
those of persons who take anything under the instrument."" However, if
the instrument does not designate a life in being to serve as the measuring
life, then the period for vesting is limited to twenty-one years. 3 9
D. Preferential Rights to Purchase
Within the area of oil and gas law, Rule Against Perpetuities issues
may arise under operating agreements, specifically where two parties who
are working on the same endeavor agree, that, in the event that one of the
parties wishes to leave the endeavor, the other party has the right to buy
his portion or interest before selling to a third party.40 This type of agree-
ment or contract provision is commonly known as a "preferential right to
purchase," "right of first refusal," or "pre-emptive right."
Although an option to purchase is traditionally subject to the Rule
Against Perpetuities, a "preferential right to purchase" is not truly an op-
tion. An option to purchase is usually a contract provision that specifies a
fixed price, which may be exercised by the holder at some future time,
possibly beyond the limit imposed by the Rule Against Perpetuities.4 1
31. See Dukeminier, supra note 26, at 1657 (quoting C.M. Sappideen & P.J. Butt, Rendering the
Rule Against Perpetuities Less Remote, 8 SYDNEY L. REv. 620, 633-34 (1979)).
32. Id. at 1657.





38. JoHN A. BORRON, JR. & LEWIS M. SIMES, 3 SIMES AND SMmH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTER-
ESTs § 1223 (3d. ed. 2011).
39. Id. § 1225.
40. Bruce M. Kramer, Modern Applications of the Rule Against Perpetuities to Oil and Gas
Transactions: What the Duke of Norfolk Didn't Tell You, 37 NAT. RESOURCES J. 281, 300-01 (1997).
41. Id. at 301.
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However, a preferential right to purchase is a contract provision that gives
parties to a contract the right to purchase another party's interest in prop-
erty in the event they want to sell or convey their interest to a third party.4 2
The difference is that a preferential right to purchase does not restrain
free alienation because it is does not specify a price at the outset, but rather
"amounts to no more than a continuing and preferred right to buy at the
market price whenever the lessor desires to sell." 43 In other words, this
right only arises if the owner wants to sell or convey his interest to a third
party; therefore, the right merely gives the holder the ability to acquire the
interest for the same price as the third party or at the current market
price."
Although preferential right to purchase provisions have been contro-
versial, they do serve important purposes in the development of mineral
property, e.g., oil and gas leases or operating agreements. 4 5  Given that oil
and gas agreements generally "involve (1) risk and uncertainty inherent in
unknown mineral potential and (2) multiple parties," preferential rights
provisions within these agreements serve two important purposes.4 6 First,
preferential rights provisions assure "an opportunity to acquire further in-
terests in the contract area." 47 Additionally, the holder of the right can
decide whether to let outside parties into a joint venture by either purchas-
ing the interest or letting a third party acquire the interest. In other words,
preferential rights allow the original contracting parties the ability to ac-
quire a larger share in the endeavor for which they "have been at risk in
exploratory efforts which may have contributed to the development of the
42. Id. at 300-01; The most common form of a preferential right to purchase is provided by the
American Association of Professional Landmen Form 610 which provides:
Should any party desire to sell all or any part of its interests under this agreement, or its rights
and interests in the Contract Area, it shall promptly give written notice to the other parties,
with full information concerning its proposed disposition, which shall include the name and
address of the prospective transferee (who must be ready, willing and able to purchase), the
purchase price, a legal description sufficient to identify the property, and all other terms of the
offer. The other parties shall then have an optional right, for a period often (10) days after the
notice is delivered, to purchase for the stated consideration on the same terms and conditions
the interest which the other party proposes to sell; and, if this optional right is exercised, the
purchasing parties shall share the purchased interest in the proportions that the interest of
each bears to the total interest of all purchasing parties. However, there shall be no preferen-
tial right to purchase in those cases where any party wishes to mortgage its interests, or to
transfer title to its interest to its mortgagee in lieu of or pursuant to foreclosure of a mortgage
of its interests, or to dispose of its interest by merger, reorganization, consolidation, or by sale
of all or substantially all of its Oil and Gas assets to any party, or by transfer of its interest to a
subsidiary or parent company or to a subsidiary of a parent company, or to any company in
which such party owns a majority of the stock.
Timothy C. Dowd, Preferential Rights to Purchase in Oil and Gas Transactions, 49 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L.
INST. §5.02 (2003).
43. Kramer, supra note 40, at 301.
44. Id. at 300-01.
45. See Conine, supra note 7, at 1315.
46. J.R. Cooney & L.P. Ausherman, Preferential Purchase Rights in Mineral Agreements, 37
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INsT. § 9.01 (1991).
47. Conine, supra note 7, at 1317.
528 [VOL. 30:523
TO VEST OR NOT TO VEST?
property" before allowing a third party to benefit from their investment in
the endeavor.48
Secondly, preferential rights ensure that original parties to an agree-
ment maintain some sort of control over "excluding undesirable partici-
pants who may not have the necessary financial ability to bear their share
of expenditures or who might frustrate development with management and
engineering philosophies which current participants oppose." 49 In other
words, if an original party decides to sell their interest in a joint venture,
the other parties to the venture should be able to decide whether they want
to include a third party based on concerns of the third party's financial
stability and whether the original parties believe they can continue to oper-
ate amicably with the third party.
Typically, preferential rights are triggered by the proposed 'sale' of
property by its current owner5o Most courts, although not universally ac-
cepted, require an actual transfer of property between willing parties for
cash consideration before the preferential right is triggered.5 ' Involuntary
sales such as foreclosure sales, judicial sales, condemnations, transfers by
descent, or public sales do not generally initiate preferential rights provi-
sions.52 Also failing to trigger preferential rights are mortgages, disposi-
tions by merger, reorganization or consolidations, or sale of all or
substantially all of the assets of a related company.5 Generally, the test
courts employ "to determine whether [a] 'sale' has occurred has been the
presence of an arms-length transaction or the transfer of title beyond the
reach of the holder of the [preferential] right." 5 4
In instances where preferential rights are triggered by the owner's de-
sire to sell, the parties' obligations are simple but must be strictly ob-
served.55 First, the party who desires to sell must give the holder of the
preferential right notice of the proposed sale and offer the holder the op-
portunity to exercise his right. 56 The holder must be given the opportunity
to purchase the interest on identical terms available to the third party with
no increase in price or different terms." After notice is given, the prefer-
ential right becomes an option to purchase for which the holder may exer-
cise his right by accepting the offer on identical terms, but if the holder
attempts to modify the terms, his actions constitute a rejection of the of-
fer.5 8 Failure to respond to the offer or exercise the option within the spec-
ified time frame results in a waiver of the preferential right. 59 Depending
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1318.
51. Id.
52. Id. 1318-19.
53. Id. at 1320.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1323.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1323-24.
59. Id. at 1324.
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on the jurisdiction, remedies for breach of preferential rights provisions
generally include specific performance or damages.6 0
These preferential rights provisions are common in numerous types of
oil and gas agreements including mining joint venture agreements, joint
operating agreements, unit operating agreements, lease agreements, farm
out agreements, and gas purchase agreements.6 1 These types of provisions
are important and routinely used in various types of oil and gas transac-
tions in Mississippi.
III. ANALYSIS
After going through the rule and its idiosyncrasies, simply put, Missis-
sippi no longer applies the rule to preferential rights to purchase in oil and
gas transactions. Now let me tell you why. Although the validity of prefer-
ential rights provisions are often challenged on the basis of the Rule
Against Perpetuities, the Mississippi Supreme Court, in Murphy Explora-
tion & Production Co. v. Sun Operating Ltd. Partnership,62 overturned the
bright-line rule that applied the Rule Against Perpetuities to preferential
rights as contingent interests and instead carved out a "commercial transac-
tion" exception for preferential rights within oil and gas transactions.
A. Mississippi's Rule Prior to 1999
In Mississippi prior to 1999, the Rule Against Perpetuities was applied
strictly and mechanically, striking down preferential rights due to their un-
limited time frame for exercise, or due to their exercise outside the
timeframe required under the rule 63 In other words, preferential rights
were strictly construed as contingent interests and therefore subject to the
rule regardless of the public policy behind the rule's adoption. Mississippi
abided by the rule's strict time limit on contingent future interests and
voided all interests failing to meet the restriction.
Prior to the Supreme Court taking a stance on the issue, there were
two conflicting theories regarding the application of the Rule Against Per-
petuities to preferential rights.6 4 The first theory is that the rule firmly for-
bids remote vesting "and should be applied [in] all situations where vesting
[occurs] remotely." 6 5 Under this theory, the argument is that preferential
rights within oil and gas transactions are invalid under the rule because "it
gives the holder [of the right] a conditional right to specific performance,
which creates the possibility of a future vesting of an estate, which could
vest beyond the period permitted by the Rule."66
60. Id. at 1324-25.
61. Cooney, supra note 46, at § 9.02.
62. 747 So. 2d 260 (Miss. 1999).
63. Kemp & Newman. supra note 2. at § 16.05[8].
64. Timothy C. Dowd, Preferential Rights to Purchase in Oil and Gas Transactions, 49 ROCKY
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The second theory is that the Rule Against Perpetuities is more policy
driven and "that the Rule is another aspect of the policy against restraints
on alienation and should not be applied where the practical alienability and
use of the land is not impaired." 7 Courts following this theory hold that
the rule is designed to prevent "unreasonable restraints on alienation" and
if the preferential rights do not impinge on alienation, "but only [direct]
who shall have the first right to [purchase] property," if and when the
owner decides to sell, then the provision does not fall within the protec-
tions of the rule.68 Mississippi recently chose to follow the second theory,
or the modern approach discussed infra.
Before moving to Mississippi's new stance, it is important to discuss
the law prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Murphy. Prior to Murphy,
the rule was applied strictly and invalidated all interests that vested too
remotely, no matter what context, i.e., donative or commercial, and was not
concerned with the duration of vested interests.69 Before Murphy, Missis-
sippi failed to distinguish between donative and commercial transactions
and viewed preferential rights as non-vested interests subject to the rule
because these provisions, in their very nature, are meant to vest in the fu-
ture. Mississippi chose to focus solely on remoteness of vesting, and thus
disregarded the public policy behind the rule, e.g., whether the contingent
future interest actually restrained alienation. Instead, the court was blind
to the rule's purpose and merely focused on the time limits for vesting.7 1
However, Mississippi did adopt an alternate version of the traditional
Rule Against Perpetuities. In 1966, Mississippi adopted the "wait-and-see"
doctrine in Phelps v. Shropshire and, therefore, chose to alter the classic
common law application of the rule.7 2 Under the wait-and-see doctrine, a
contingent future interest is not automatically void so long as it actually
vests during the perpetuity period.7 3
Consequently, under Mississippi's old approach, the Rule Against Per-
petuities did apply to preferential rights to purchase since they were classi-
fied as contingent future interests.7 4  Even under the wait-and-see
exception, preferential rights were still viewed as contingent interests and,
therefore, subjected to the rule. The Mississippi Supreme Court stated this
stance in Pace v. Culpepper:
A [preferential] right to purchase real estate ... is held to be
subject to the rule against perpetuities. Thus, it has been
ruled that a contractual right, granted to A and his heirs and
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See Carter v. Berry, 140 So. 2d 843 (Miss. 1962); May v. Hunt, 404 So. 2d 1373, 1376 (Miss.
1981).
70. May, 404 So. 2d at 1376.
71. Carter, 140 So. 2d at 846.
72. Phelps v. Shropshire, 183 So. 2d 158, 162 (Miss. 1966).
73. Id.
74. See Estate of Anderson v. Deposit Guar. Nat'I Bank, 541 So. 2d 423, 423 (Miss. 1989).
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assigns, unlimited as to time, to purchase real estate upon
the same terms as the owner could and would sell to a third
person, is void.7
Consequently, prior to 1999, Mississippi viewed preferential rights as con-
tingent future interests and not vested interests, which made them suscepti-
ble to the rule's time restraints. In doing so, Mississippi disregarded the
public policy concerns behind the rule and strictly applied the rule's time
restrictions.
B. Changing the Rule in Mississippi-Murphy Exploration &
Production Company v. Sun Operating Limited Partnership
In 1999, the Mississippi Supreme Court held that an operating agree-
ment's preferential right to purchase did not violate the Rule Against Per-
petuities. 6 In Murphy Exploration & Production Co. v. Sun Operating
Ltd. Partnership, Sun, Murphy, and Como were all co-tenants holding in-
terests in certain oil and gas leases.7 The Joint Operating Agreement, to
which all three were parties, provided for preferential rights to purchase,
meaning that a co-tenant must provide prior notice to the other co-tenants
in the event one decided to sell his interest so that the other co-tenants
could, if they desired, meet the anticipated purchase price.78
Although Murphy and Sun were not original parties to the Joint Oper-
ating Agreement, both were subsequently assigned interests under the
agreement.7 9 Issues arose when Sun, without giving notice to Murphy or
Como, sold its interest to Mississippi Oil Acquisitions, a third party.8 0
Murphy and Como subsequently filed suit against Sun requesting specific
performance of their preferential rights to purchase. 1
On Motion for Summary Judgment, Sun argued that Murphy's and
Como's preferential rights were invalid pursuant to the Rule Against Per-
petuities.82 The chancery court agreed, granted Sun's motion, and dis-
missed the lawsuit." An appeal to the Mississippi Supreme Court
followed. 84
Justice Waller, writing for the majority, reversed the lower court's
holding, and stated that the rule against perpetuities did not apply." In
making the decision, the court discussed the purpose of the rule and that
"[t]he Rule was designed to prevent undue accumulations of land and
75. Pace v. Culpepper, 347 So. 2d 1313, 1317 (Miss. 1977).
76. See Murphy Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Sun Operating Ltd. P'ship, 747 So. 2d 260 (Miss.
1999).
77. Id. at 260.
78. Id.






85. Id. at 260.
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wealth in the hands of a few." 8 6 Further, the court discussed that the rule's
adoption was in reaction to "donative transactions such as wills or deeds"
where wealthy landowners would pass their estates to their families or heirs
by controlling the property's devolution "by directing the disposition [of
the property] upon the happening of certain contingencies."" Therefore,
the rule was adopted for policy reasons in order to prevent tying up title to
property for generations and generations.8 8
Furthermore, the court discussed that the rule did not apply to this
situation because free alienation of the property at issue was not restrained
and the interest in question was not a "donative transaction" but a lease-
hold interest in minerals. 8 9
In reaching its decision, the court relied on the Fifth Circuit's 1936
case, Weber v. Texas Co., depicting the inapplicability of the Rule Against
Perpetuities in regards to the analogous right of first refusal.9 0 In Weber,
the Fifth Circuit held that certain types of options within oil and gas leases
would not be subject to scrutiny under the Rule Against Perpetuities. 1
There the court focused on the underlying purpose of the rule: "to avoid
fettering real property with future interests dependent upon contingencies
unduly remote which isolate the property and exclude it from commerce
and development for long periods of time, thus working an indirect re-
straint upon alienation, which is regarded at common law as a public
evil. "92
The court further held that because the right of first refusal in Weber,
much like a preferential right to purchase, was not an exclusive option at a
fixed price that could be exercised beyond the time limit imposed by the
Rule Against Perpetuities, the right of first refusal did not fall within either
the purpose of or the reason for the rule.93 Therefore, under this type of
right, the holder cannot prevent a sale or impinge alienation but is merely
afforded the first opportunity to buy in the event the owner decides to
sell. 94
In Weber, the Fifth Circuit focused on the purpose and the policy be-
hind the adoption of the Rule Against Perpetuities and held that invalidat-
ing preferential rights did not fulfill the underlying public policy aims
intended by the rule. 95 The court also pointed out its continued pattern of
86. Id. at 261.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 262.
90. Id.
91. See Weber v. Texas Co., 83 F.2d 807 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 561 (1936).
92. Id. at 808 (citing London Sw. Ry. Co. v. Gomm, (1882) 20 Ch. D. 562 (Eng.); Barton v. Thaw,
92 A. 312 (Pa. 1914); TEX. JUR. PERPETUITIES AND RESTRAINTS § 4, at 830; 3 THOMPSON ON REAL
PROPERTY 724; 1 TIFFANY ON REAL PROPERTY 592 (2d ed.); 48 C.J. 934; 21 R.C.I. 288).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Murphy Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Sun Operating Ltd. P'ship, 747 So. 2d 260, 262 (Miss.
1999).
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following sound Texas precedent in areas of first impression concerning oil
and gas law.96 Relying on said precedent:
Texas Courts have long held that the Rule is "only a means
of preventing unreasonable restraints on alienation," and "if
a preferential right to purchase does not operate to restrain
alienation, but only dictates who shall have the first right to
acquire property when and if the owner desires to sell it,
then the agreement is not within the prohibition." 7
The Mississippi Supreme Court further pointed out that oil and gas
transactions are a special breed given that courts that do apply the rule to
preferential rights refrain from doing so in oil and gas leases because these
types of leases have a limited duration, i.e., the lease is only valid while
production is ongoing, and the preferential rights only exists while the lease
exists.98
However, it is important to note that not all members of the court
were on board with overturning years of precedent in order to carve out a
"commercial transaction" exception.9 9 Justice McRae dissented from the
court's decision in Murphy. Joined by both Justices Sullivan and Pittman,
Justice McRae disagreed with overturning previous Mississippi prece-
dent."m McRae believed that the chancery court was correct in holding
that the preferential right to purchase violated the Rule Against Perpetu-
ities and that commercial transactions were not exempt from the rule.10'
McRae supported a mechanical interpretation of the rule "that the 'exclu-
sion of property from the channels of commercial development for ex-
tended periods of time is a public evil' " and "operates to void any
conveyance of property that creates a future estate which might possibly
not become vested within a life or lives in being at the time of its creation
plus twenty-one years thereafter."102
McRae noted Mississippi's adoption of the wait-and-see doctrine and
discussed the measuring life of twenty-one years when all parties to an
agreement are corporations. 03 Under this view, McRae agreed with Sun's
argument that the preferential right failed to vest within twenty-one years
of the contract and was therefore void under the rule against perpetu-
ities. 04 Overall, Justice McRae felt that overturning precedent to "carve[ ]
96. Id. at 263 (quoting Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Millette, 72 So. 2d 176, 182 (Miss. 1954)) (citing
Williamson v. Elf Aquitaine, Inc., 138 F.3d 546, 550 (5th Cir. 1998)).
97. Id. at 262 (quoting Forderhause v. Cherokee Water Co., 623 S.W.2d 435, 438 (Tex. Civ. App.
1981)).
98. Id. at 263.
99. Id. at 264 (McRae, J., dissenting).
100. Id.
101. Id.
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out an exception," solely to please the "big-moneyed oil interest[ ]," was
inappropriate. 0 5
C. Mississippi's Rule Today-the Modern Approach
Over the past thirty years, the majority of courts have begun to follow
the contemporary trend of exempting commercial preferential rights to
purchase from the Rule Against Perpetuities. This contemporary trend is
reiterated in both the Restatement of the Law Third-Property (Servi-
tudes) and the Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities. The Missis-
sippi Supreme Court's decision in Murphy conforms to this modern trend.
Prior to 1999, commercial transactions were not exempt from the rule
in Mississippi. The court's decision in Murphy followed the judicial trend
to exempt commercial transactions from the rule's application. Following
the court's decision in Murphy, the rule was viewed not only as "a technical
rule to be mechanically applied," but also as a judicial creation which
serves important public policy considerations that "should be applied with
those polices in mind." 0 6
The modern trend is to relax the inflexible application of the Rule
Against Perpetuities with a number of courts taking the view that the rule
should not automatically apply but instead "follow tenable legal theories
which will give effect to the intention of the parties."1 07 These courts fol-
low the rationale that:
[T]he Rule is only a means of preventing unreasonable and
indefinite suspensions of the power to alienate or transfer
property interests, and if a [preferential right] only dictates
who shall have the right to acquire the property and does
not impinge on the owner's ability or desire to sell, then
such a right does not fall within the common law
prohibition.0 8
This modern trend on preferential rights follows the Fifth Circuit's holding
in Weber that a preferential right to purchase is no more than a right to buy
if the buyer decides to sell and therefore does not restrain alienation.10 9
The owner may sell at any time, but must merely afford the holder the first
right to buy."0 The holder cannot prevent the sale of property; therefore,
the right is not invalid as a perpetuity.1 '
105. See id. at 264 (McRae, J., dissenting).
106. Kemp & Newman, supra note 2, at § 16.04.
107. Id. at § 16.05; First Nat'1 Bank & Trust Co. of Okla. City v. Sidwell Corp., 678 P.2d 118, 126
(Kan. 1984).
108. Kemp & Newman, supra note 2, at § 16.05 (emphasis added).
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Along the same lines as Weber, the Mississippi Supreme Court also
looked to an Oklahoma case, Producers Oil Co. v. Gore."2 The issue in
Producers Oil Co. was whether a preferential right that created reciprocal
rights of first refusal violated the rule. 1 1 3 The United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Oklahoma held:
[T]he Rule Against Perpetuities should not apply to oil and
gas operating agreements... [The rule] could not have been
intended to apply, it should not apply and no worthwhile
social or economic purpose is served by applying it to this
common, frequent and useful type of oil and gas transac-
tion. The provision in question does not clog alienation.' 14
The Oklahoma Supreme Court, via certified question from the federal
court, upheld the preferential right provision as well; however, the court
took a different course to arrive at its result."5 The Oklahoma Supreme
Court focused on the duration of the preferential rights provision and
stated:
Mineral leases and their accompanying operating agree-
ments have built in duration. Oil and gas production cannot
last indefinitely and rights are always terminable. As stated
[by the Federal District Court], the provision for preemptive
rights is not a restraint on alienation and can last only as
long as the agreement and the lease itself continues." 6
In other words, the Oklahoma Supreme Court did not view preferential
rights as contingent interests.
In addition, some courts who follow the modern trend exempt all pref-
erential right to purchase provisions from the rule as they consider the pro-
visions to be vested interests, not contingent interests and therefore exempt
all together, much like the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Producer's Oil
Co.117 These courts view preferential rights as a presently vested right
which "create[s] a conditional fee.. . [that] is vested and presently reserved
in the [holder of the right]."'1 8
Even courts that apply the rule to preferential rights distinguish pref-
erential rights within oil and gas leases. Due to their limited duration, and
because the preferential rights only exists while the oil and gas lease exists,
112. 610 P.2d 772 (Okla. 1980).
113. Id. at 772.
114. Kemp & Newman, supra note 2, at § 16.05[8] (quoting Producers Oil Co., 437 F. Supp. at
742) (The Federal District Court's judgment was vacated by the Tenth Circuit (634 F.2d 487 (1980))
when the question was certified to the Oklahoma Supreme Court which rendered a decision discussed
infra.).
115. Producers Oil Co., 610 P.2d at 772; see also Kemp & Newman, supra note 2, at § 16.05.
116. Producers Oil Co., 610 F.2d at 774; see also Kemp & Newman, supra note 2, at § 16.05.
117. Robertson v. Murphy, 510 So. 2d 180, 182-83 (Ala. 1987).
118. Id.
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it therefore cannot be considered a contingent interest susceptible to the
rule."' 9 Therefore, under the modern approach, preferential rights to
purchase under oil and gas leases are exempt from the Rule Against
Perpetuities.
Additionally, mineral leases and oil and gas agreements occur in a
commercial context, and invalidating such agreements under a strict appli-
cation of the rule does not address policy concerns but merely creates more
concern.' 20 Mississippi's new approach is now consistent with the Restate-
ment Third of Property and the Uniform Statutory Rule Against
Perpetuities.
1. The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities
The adoption of the Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities also
follows the modern judicial trend. Under section 4 of the Uniform Rule,
"commercial" or "non-donative" transactions are explicitly exempt from
the Rule Against Perpetuities.121 The section states that the statutory rule
does not apply to "a nonvested property interest or a power of appoint-
ment arising out of a nondonative [commercial] transfer."122 The rationale
for such an exclusion is that "the Rule Against Perpetuities is a wholly
inappropriate instrument of social policy to use as a control over such
[commercial] arrangements. The period of the rule-a life in being plus
twenty-one years-is not suitable for nondonative transfers."123
2. Restatement of the Law Third-Property (Servitudes)
Also following the contemporary approach is the American Law Insti-
tute's Third Revision of the Restatement of Property. Adopted in 2000,
the comments to the Restatement now state that the application of the rule
to commercial transactions is highly criticized and this criticism has lead to
many courts rejecting "application of the rule against perpetuities [to com-
mercial transactions], recognizing that it needlessly invalidated legitimate
transactions."124 The comment itself states:
The trend of modern decisions is to avoid applying the rule
against perpetuities to commercial transactions in land by
reading a reasonable time limit into the transaction or by
holding that the policies behind the Rule would not be ad-
vanced by applying it to the particular transaction. The fo-
cus of discussion in most cases is the extent to which the
servitude or other contingent interest will interfere with the
119. See, e.g., Ferrero Constr. Co. v. Dennis Rourke Corp., 536 A.2d 1137, 1141 (Md. 1988) (cited
in Murphy Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Sun Operating Ltd. P'ship, 747 So. 2d 260, 263 (Miss. 1999)).
120. See Conine, supra note 7, at 1376-77.
121. UNIw. STATUTORY RULE AGAINST PERPETUJITIEs §4 (1990).
122. Id.
123. Id. at §4 cmt.
124. Jonathan F. Mitchell, Can a Right of First Refusal Be Assigned?, 68 U. Cm. L REv. 985, 996
(2001).
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alienability of the burdened property or with the willingness
of the owner or possessor to make improvements to the
property. In taking the position that commercial transac-
tions must be concluded within reasonable time limits that
are less than the time permitted by the Rule, and in permit-
ting the social utility of the particular arrangement to avoid
invalidation, courts in fact are applying the rule against un-
reasonable restraints on alienation rather than the rule
against perpetuities. 5
Due to the majority of recent court decisions, the provisions of the
Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities, and the Third Restatement
of Property, Mississippi's new approach conforms with recent precedent
and the modern trend to exempt preferential rights to purchase in oil and
gas transactions from the Rule Against Perpetuities.
3. Measuring Lives for Corporations
Determining the measuring life is also an interesting endeavor when
dealing with oil and gas transactions. Since many oil and gas transactions
occur between two corporations and no individuals, there is no 'life' to
measure the perpetuity period. However, the Mississippi Supreme Court
addressed this issue in C & D Investment Co. v. Gulf Transportation Co.
and held that the perpetuity period between corporations is twenty-one
years.12 6
But this seems unfair for commercial transactions to be limited to such
a short period of time. Although the lower court's decision was overturned
in Murphy, it is still important to look at the unfairness of the C & D rule.
Under the wait-and-see doctrine, corporate entities are limited to only
twenty-one years to validate their interest, whereas individuals have the
benefit of the entire length of a human life plus the additional twenty-one
years.
In Murphy, the lower court held for Sun that preferential rights to
purchase were subject to the rule but used the wait-and-see exception and
because all parties were corporations the measuring life was a mere twenty-
one years. So twenty-one years after the Joint Operating Agreement was
entered into, the preferential right to purchase provision of the agreement
did not vest and was therefore void.
Although the issue is moot in regards to Murphy, Mississippi should
undertake to correct the injustice against corporate entities in the future in
areas where the Rule Against Perpetuities does apply. As an alternative,
the Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities suggests a wait-and-see
period of ninety years, a reasonable estimation of an expected life span
plus twenty-one years.127 This ninety-year rule would at least put corporate
125. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP. SERVITUJDEs § 3.3 cmt. b (emphasis added).
126. See 526 So. 2d 526 (Miss. 1988).
127. UNWe. STATUTORY RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 1(a)(2) (1990).
538 [VOL. 30:523
TO VEST OR NOT TO VEST?
entities on the same footing as individuals if they are being subjected to the
consequences and harsh restraints imposed by the Rule Against
Perpetuities.
4. Why Preferential Rights to Purchase Fall Outside the Rule's
Intended Purpose
Simply put, preferential rights do not impinge on the policy concerns
that garnered the adoption of the rule in the first place. The rule was
adopted for donative transactions, not commercial transactions. Given that
these are "commercial [agreements] between competent and sophisticated
business persons," we should defer to their intentions in entering into such
agreements and not void provisions based on mere technicalities.128 Com-
mercial transactions are fully negotiated and executed by parties with legal
capacity to contract.129 Courts should merly enforce the provisions for
which the parties have bargained for.13 0 Invalidating preferential rights in
commercial transactions does not achieve the goals intended by the Duke
of Norfolk Case.1 31 Additionally, "[t]he only party to a contract who reaps
an advantage from successfully applying the Rule to a commercial transac-
tion is the party that wishes to escape a contractual obligation for which
good consideration was given."132
5. Other Jurisdictions that Exempt Preferential Rights from the Rule
Mississippi's new approach follows in the footsteps of many jurisdic-
tions that provide an exception for preferential rights or rights of first re-
fusal; however, this list is not intended to fully exhaust all jurisdictions that
do so.
In Hinson v. Roberts, the Georgia Supreme Court held that preferen-
tial rights do not violate the rule and stated:
Even though a [preferential right] may be unlimited in dura-
tion, if it requires merely matching the offer of a third party,
the future interest of the preemptioner constitutes no im-
pediment to the transfer of the property. The clause does
not then run contrary to the purposes of the rule against
perpetuities, such as preventing the tying up of land for an
unreasonable length of time, prohibiting restraints on alien-
ation, and assuring the utilization of wealth through devel-
opment of land by its current beneficial owners.' 3 3
128. Brief of Appellants at 5-6, Murphy Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Sun Operating Ltd. P'ship,
747 So. 2d 260 (Miss. 1999) (No. 98-CA-00429).




133. 349 S.E.2d 454, 456 (Ga. 1986) (internal citations omitted).
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Faced with similar preferential rights provisions in Cambridge Co. v.
East Slope Investment Corp., the Colorado Supreme Court admitted that a
mechanical application of the rule may void that particular preferential
right, but the court recognized that the rule is not merely to be applied
mechanically but should be applied with public policy considerations in
mind, emphasizing that the rule should not be mechanically applied in in-
stances where the purposes behind the rule will not be served. 1 3 4 Further,
the court reasoned that the preferential rights at issue did not pose any
threat to alienability, and therefore, application of the rule did not further
the intended purposes of the rule.135
Similarly, the Washington Supreme Court addressed the issue in
Robroy Land Co., Inc. v. Prather, where the court upheld an unlimited
right of first refusal within an agreement to purchase real estate. 136 The
Washington Supreme Court also noted that application of the Rule Against
Perpetuities in this context did not serve the purposes of the rule and again
distinguished between a right of first refusal and an ordinary option stating
that the holder of a preferential right holds far less interest than the holder
of an ordinary option.' 37
The Alabama Supreme Court has also addressed preferential rights.
In Robertson v. Murphy, the court addressed a preferential right in a part-
nership agreement".' There the Alabama Supreme Court ruled that the
provision did not restrict alienability and was therefore exempt from the
rule. 139 The court found that the purpose of the rule was "to favor com-
merce and the circulation of property by preventing the right of absolute
disposition from being tied up or restrained beyond a certain period."' 40
Further, because preferential rights do not inhibit the sale of property, they
are not contrary to the main purposes of the rule.141
Additionally, courts in Connecticut, Idaho, Michigan, New Mexico,
Pennsylvania, and Wyoming have held that preferential rights or rights of
first refusal are exempt from the Rule Against Perpetuities.142 As the pre-
ceding decisions indicate, the modern trend is that preferential rights to
purchase do not violate the Rule Against Perpetuities. Mississippi's new
approach conforms to this line of cases and is consistent with the modern
majority rule.
134. 700 P.2d 537, 540 (Colo. 1985).
135. Id.
136. 622 P.2d 367 (Wash. 1980).
137. Id. at 369.
138. Robertson v. Murphy, 510 So. 2d 180, 180 (Ala. 1987).
139. Id. at 182.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. See JLJ Assoc., Inc. v. Persiani, 550 A.2d 650 (Conn. 1988); Meridian Bowling Lanes, Inc. v.
Meridian Athletic Ass'n, Inc., 670 P.2d 1294 (Idaho 1983); Stenke v. Masland Dev. Co., Inc., 394
N.W.2d 418 (Mich. 1986); Gartley v. Ricketts, 760 P.2d 143 (N.M. 1988); Se. Penn. Transp. Auth. v.
Phila. Transp. Co., 233 A.2d 15 (Penn. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1011 (1968); Harnett v. Jones, 629
P.2d 1357 (Wyo. 1981).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, the purpose of the Rule Against Perpetuities was to pre-
vent tying up property and restraining alienability. Simply put, oil and gas
leases do not tie up land or prevent alienability and therefore should not be
subject to scrutiny under the rule. Mississippi is now following the modern
approach to the Rule Against Perpetuities and looking to the underlying
purposes of the rule before striking down preferential rights provisions that
do not impinge on alienability.
Post Murphy, Mississippi is taking a step back from an ill-suited,
mechanical rule and is now actually looking at the root of property inter-
ests and whether public policy supports their validity, instead of strictly
focusing on remote vesting. In the oil and gas context, this new approach
upholds contractual obligations that parties bargain for, rather than invali-
dating obligations for mere technicalities, and in doing so, prevents parties
from avoiding the consequences of breaching preferential right to purchase
provisions.

